Topic: The Armchair on Trial
This academic year’s topic is called ‘The Armchair on Trial’. The original topic proposal can be seen here. The topic is chiefly about philosophical methodology – what it is and what it ought to be – and related questions about the nature and scope of philosophical inquiry. We will be discussing questions like the following:
Central Questions:
What role do and should intuitions play in philosophy? Should we be worried if philosophical intuitions are not universally held or have a contingent causal history?
What kind of phenomena is philosophy about? Concepts? Material entities? Natural kinds? Others?
What does philosophy do with the things it investigates? Does it ‘merely’ analyze? Does it ameliorate?
Can philosophical questions be answered by doing empirical investigations?
Reading Schedule
Our readings for the coming year will be posted below as the semester progresses. A preliminary reading schedule can be viewed here:
12.12.2025, Session #8
Weinberg, J. M. (2017). What is Negative Experimental Philosophy Good For? In G. D’Oro & S. Overgaard (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology (pp. 161–184). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344118.010
05.12.2025, Session #7
Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (2007). Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions. Noûs, 41(4), 663–685. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x
28.11.2025, Session #6
Weinberg, J. M., Gonnerman, C., Buckner, C., & Alexander, J. (2010). Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters? Philosophical Psychology, 23(3), 331–355. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2010.490944
21.11.2025, Session #5
Goldman, A. I. (2007). Philosophical Intuitions. Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 74, 1–26.
14.11.2025, Session #4
Bengson, J. (2015). The Intellectual Given. Mind, 124(495), 707–760. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv029.
07.11.2025, Session #3
Chudnoff, E. (2017). The Reality of the Intuitive. Inquiry, 60(4), 371–385. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2016.1220640.
31.10.2025, Session #2
Bealer, G. (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In M. R. DePaul & W. Ramsey (Eds), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry (pp. 201–240). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. (Sections II & III)
24.10.2025, Session #1
Bealer, G. (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In M. R. DePaul & W. Ramsey (Eds), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry (pp. 201–240). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. (Sections I & II)