Topic: The Armchair on Trial
This academic year’s topic is called ‘The Armchair on Trial’. The original topic proposal can be seen here. The topic is chiefly about philosophical methodology – what it is and what it ought to be – and related questions about the nature and scope of philosophical inquiry. We will be discussing questions like the following:
Central Questions:
- What is the role of intuition in philosophy?
- What is the role of a priori knowledge in philosophy?
- What is the role of X-Phi in philosophy?
- What is the role of conceptual analysis in philosophy?
- What is the role of conceptual engineering in philosophy?
- What is the role of linguistic and conceptual competence in philosophy?
- What is the role of formal methods in philosophy?
- Is philosophy importantly distinct from other sciences?
- How can advocates of armchair methods best respond to the challenges raised by X-Phi?
- Are armchair philosophy and X-Phi reconcilable?
- Considering the methodological discussions listed above, are professional philosophers epistemically better positioned for answering philosophical questions than lay people? E.g. Do they have better conceptual competence? Are they expert intuiters?
Reading Schedule
Our readings for the ongoing academic year will be posted below as the semester progresses. A preliminary reading schedule can be viewed here:
29.05.2026, Session #20
Kusch, M., & McKenna, R. (2025). Kornblith, Naturalism, Relativism. In J. DiPaolo & L. R. G. Oliveira (Hrsg.), Kornblith and His Critics (1. Aufl., S. 21–38). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781394374366.ch2
21.05.2026, Session #19
Q&A with Martin Kusch
15.05.2026, Session #18
Kusch, M. (2025). Integrated Philosophy and Sociology of Science: The Example of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. In S. J. Veigl & A. Currie (Hrsg.), Methods in the Philosophy of Science: A User’s Guide (S. 419–439). MIT Press.
Kusch, M. (2018). The Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge Revisited: Relativism, Scepticism, Reductionism. In Philosophy and the Historical Perspective (S. 200–212). British Academy. https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197266298.003.0013
08.05.2026, Session #17
Nimtz, C., unpublished manuscript.
01.05.2026
No Session [Labour Day]
23.04.2026, Session #16
Haslanger, S. (2012). What Knowledge Is and What It Ought to Be: Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology. In S. Haslanger, Resisting Reality (pp. 341–364). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199892631.003.0012
17.04.2026, Session #15
Jackson, F. (2000). The Role of Conceptual Analysis. In F. Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (1st edn, pp. 28–55). Oxford University PressOxford. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198250614.003.0002
27.03.2026, Session #14
Kornblith, H. (2002). Knowledge as Natural Phenomenon. In Knowledge and Its Place in Nature (pp. 28–69). OUP.
20.03.2026, Session #13
Kornblith, H. (2014). Is There Room for Armchair Theorizing in Epistemology? In Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? (pp. 195–216). Routledge.
13.03.2026, Session #12
Mortensen, K., & Nagel, J. (2016). Armchair‐Friendly Experimental Philosophy. In J. Sytsma & W. Buckwalter (Eds), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy (1st edn, pp. 53–70). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118661666.ch4
16.01.2026, Session #11
Nagel, J. (2012). Intuitions and Experiments. A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85(3), 495–527.
09.01.2026, Session #10
Strevens, M. (2019). Learning Without the Senses. In Thinking Off Your Feet. How Empirical Psychology Vindicates Armchair Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
19.12.2025, Session #9
The Vienna Circle. (1973 [1929]). The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle [Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis]. In M. Neurath & R. S. Cohen (Eds), Empiricism and Sociology (pp. 299–318). Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2525-6_9.
12.12.2025, Session #8
Weinberg, J. M. (2017). What is Negative Experimental Philosophy Good For? In G. D’Oro & S. Overgaard (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology (pp. 161–184). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344118.010
05.12.2025, Session #7
Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (2007). Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions. Noûs, 41(4), 663–685. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x
28.11.2025, Session #6
Weinberg, J. M., Gonnerman, C., Buckner, C., & Alexander, J. (2010). Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters? Philosophical Psychology, 23(3), 331–355. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2010.490944
21.11.2025, Session #5
Goldman, A. I. (2007). Philosophical Intuitions. Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 74, 1–26.
14.11.2025, Session #4
Bengson, J. (2015). The Intellectual Given. Mind, 124(495), 707–760. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv029.
07.11.2025, Session #3
Chudnoff, E. (2017). The Reality of the Intuitive. Inquiry, 60(4), 371–385. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2016.1220640.
31.10.2025, Session #2
Bealer, G. (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In M. R. DePaul & W. Ramsey (Eds), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry (pp. 201–240). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. (Sections II & III)
24.10.2025, Session #1
Bealer, G. (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In M. R. DePaul & W. Ramsey (Eds), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry (pp. 201–240). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. (Sections I & II)